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Abstract: Since Indonesia has undergone a decentralisation 
phase, its regions have searched for their local identities. In 
West Sumatra, for instance, Islam is dominant. Conse-
quently, there has been a constant attempt to infuse Islamic 
values into social, political and economic aspects. The 
paper seeks to contextualise the key phases in the history of 
West Sumatra in the broader history of the archipelago and 
the Malay world, and to show how key events in West 
Sumatra and at the national level set the parameters for 
later debates about Islam and identity in the region. The 
paper argues that now, as in the past, the relationship 
between Islam, a global religion, and Minangkabau culture 
was, and is, simultaneously contested. It is also found that 
Islam as an ideology was subordinated after Independence 
days, and again under the New Order. The strong 
association between Islam and regional identity only 
solidified in the post-Suharto. Now, regional governments 
has been utilising claims that local customs are based on 
Islam and Islam is based on the Qur’an. 
Keywords: Sufism, orthodoxy, Minangkabau, Malay world. 
Introduction 
Before the arrival of Islam, The Minangkabau people believed a 
South Indian version of Hindu-Buddhism brought to the region by 
Indian merchants in the third and fourth centuries.1They are also a 
matrilineal society in which ancestral property such as land and houses 
arepassed down from mothers to daughters. Kinship is also based 
around the female line.  
                                                                
1 I. Manan, “A Short History of Minangkabau,” in A. Summerfield and J. Summerfield 
(eds), Walk in Splendor: Ceremonial Dress and the Minangkabau (Los Angeles: UCLA 
Fowler Museum of Cultural History, 1999), p. 50. 
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In the seventh century, Sumatra was very much part of the Malay 
world (Alam Melayu). That world was based around the powerful and 
prosperous Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms of Srivijaya, based in Bukit 
Seguntang in Palembang, and Melayu, which was associated with the 
Batang Hari River in Jambi.2 In the eleventh century, after the collapse 
of Srivijaya, and in a period when international trade between India 
and China through the Straits of Malacca came to be dominated by the 
Cholas of India, the term Melayu referred to interior areas in Jambi.3 In 
the fourteenth century, Melayu appeared in Javanese literature, where it 
referred to an area that extended to other territories such as Lampung, 
Pattani in modern Thailand, Kelantan in Malaysia and the 
Minangkabau region of West Sumatra.4 In that same century, Malacca, 
a region made prosperous by its position at the centre of key trading 
routes, emerged as the new centre of the Malay world. Because of the 
establishment of the kingdom of Malacca, the name Melayu and its 
defining characteristics such as dress, language and religion became 
associated with Malacca Malays.5 When Malacca became a powerful 
Muslim state in the same century, Islam came to be identified with 
Malay culture. This connection then began the association of Islam 
with the Malay people.6 While a Hindu-Buddhist Minangkabau 
kingdom was established in 1347 by Adityawarman, a prince from the 
post-Srivijaya kingdom of Dharmasyraya who was raised in the 
Javanese kingdom of Majapahit,7 those living in the coastal areas of 
West Sumatra identified themselves as Malays rather than Minang-
kabau, as a result of the influence of the Malaccan Malays.8 
                                                                
2 L.Y. Andaya, “Aceh’s Contribution to Standards of Malayness,” Archipel, 61 no. 1 
(2001), p. 31. 
3 Ibid. 
4 A. Reid, “Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source of Diverse Modern Identities,” 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 32 (2001): pp. 295-313.  
5 Andaya, “Aceh’s Contribution to Standards of Malayness,” p. 33 
6 E. Utrecht, “The Muslim Merchant Class in the Indonesian Social and Political 
Struggles,” Social Compass, 31 no. 1 (1984), p. 31. 
7 F. Colombijn, Paco-paco (kota) Padang: Sejarah Sebuah Kota di Indonesia pada abad ke 20 
dan Penggunaan Ruang Kota (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Ombak, 2006), p. 55. 
8 J. Drakard, A. Malay Frontier: Unity and Duality in A Sumatran Kingdom (New York: 
Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1990), p. 11. 
  
Delmus Puneri Salim 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 01, June 2013 
98 
Scholars have proposed a number of theories to explain the 
conversion of the Malay world to Islam. Al-Attas argues that Islam was 
introduced directly by Arabs to Malay Sumatra in the seventh century, 
citing a Chinese report of the existence of an Arab settlement in East 
Sumatra in 674, the earliest known record of probable Muslim 
settlement in Malay Sumatra. Others argue that Islam came to the 
Malay world from India in the twelfth century, citing the existence of 
international maritime trade routes, the commonality of schools of 
jurisprudence and the similarity of gravestones and literary styles and 
themes between India and the Malay world as evidence for this theory. 
Others say that Islam came from India to Sumatra at the end of the 
thirteenth century through the kingdoms of Pasai and Perlak.9 What is 
clear is that in the fourteenth century, the laws of Malacca (Undang-
undang Melaka) used the term ‘Kanun’ (Arabic qanun) meaning 
administrative law, as used in the Ottoman Empire, and the Pasai 
chronicle of Aceh also frequently invokes both the terms ‘adat’ (from 
the Arabic ‘a>dah), meaning customs, and ‘Kanun’.10 
Importantly also, merchant Arabs from the Hadramaut (now 
Yemen and Oman), who had visited and settled in Malay Sumatra 
before the seventeenth century, settled in the Straits of Malacca and 
what is now called South Sumatra, from the late seventeenth century.11 
Many reformist Muslims in the Malay world, such as Nuruddin Al-
Raniri and Sayyid Abd Al-Samad Palimbani, were of Hadramaut 
descent.12 This contact continued into the early twentieth century, 
when Ahmad Surkati taught Islam at various schools in Batavia 
(Jakarta). By the early twentieth century, there were more than twenty 
thousand Hadramauti Arabs in the archipelago.13 
 
                                                                
9 Andaya, “Aceh’s Contribution to Standards of Malayness,” p. 36. 
10 A.C. Milner, “Islam and Malay Kingship,” Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, 113 (1981), 
p. 47. 
11 W. Roff. The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 
p. 81. 
12 Azyumardi Azra, Jaringan Global dan Lokal: Islam Nusantara (Bandung: Mizan, 2002), 
p. 139. 
13 A. Reid, An Indonesian Frontier: Acehnese and Other Histories of Sumatra (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press, 2005), p. 230. 
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The Arrival of Sufism 
Sufism, which came to Malay Sumatra via the trading routes 
between various parts of Asia and the Middle East, was an important 
element in the introduction of Islam to the Malay world. Sufi Islam 
emphasised the belief that it is possible to have direct experience of 
God or direct communication with God under the guidance of 
charismatic leaders.14 The mystical expression of the Islamic faith has 
both an intellectual dimension, consisting of Sufi teaching, and an 
organisational dimension called t}ari >qah (tarekat in Indonesian), or 
brotherhood.15 
Sufi traders used Islam as a means of establishing cooperation with 
local chiefs and the merchant class. Because of the dominance of trade 
in the region, the centres of religious power were at the same time 
centres of economic power.16 As Utrecht points out, Islam took hold 
fastest among the trader class.17 Wealthy merchants had the means to 
fund the education of their children and to fulfil the religious 
obligation to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca, which consequently 
brought them into closer contact with Islam.18 Sufism was, however, 
subsequently transmitted through other channels, as Sufi teachers 
married the daughters of Malay Indonesian nobility, which mean that 
their children had royal blood and therefore were well-placed to spread 
Islam.19 
                                                                
14 J.S. Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 
1 
15 J. Voll, “Foreword.” in Trimingham, The Sufi Orders, vii; Howell argues that the 
term Sufi has many different meanings. It can be associated with devotional practices 
and religious concepts that are quite separate from Sufism’s common association with 
mysticism. See J.D. Howell, “Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival,” The Journal of 
Asian Studies, 60 no. 3 (2001): pp. 701-729. 
16 Kahane, among others, has pointed out that economic interests, not purely religious 
motives, enhanced the spread of Islam into the Malay archipelago. See, R. Kahane, 
“Religious Diffusion and Modernisation: A Preliminary Reflection on The Spread of 
Islam in Indonesia and Its Impact on Social Change,”  European Journal of Sociology, 21 
no. 1 (1980): pp. 116-137. 
17 Utrecht, “The Muslim Merchant Class,” p. 33. 
18 H.M. Federspiel, Persatuan Islam, Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia (New 
York: Ithaca Cornell University, 1970), p. 7. 
19 H. Johns, “Sufism as A Category in Indonesian Literature and History,” Journal of 
Southeast Asian History, 2, no. 2 (1961), p. 17. 
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The nature of Sufism played an important role in the acceptance of 
Islam in Malay Sumatra. Johns argues that the Sufis who preached 
Islam in the region ‘were prepared to preserve continuity with the past 
and to use the terms and elements of pre-Islamic culture in an Islamic 
context’.20 As Sufi Islam did not challenge local animist beliefs, it could 
penetrate the Malay world in a peaceful way. At the same time, 
however, some scholars argue that Sufi Islam created a new identity in 
the Malay world,21 serving as ‘a liberation creed’ against the feudalism 
of the Hindu society and caste system imported from India and 
institutionalised under the Hindu kingdoms.22 Islam also provided local 
rulers with a consensual basis upon which to engage with Muslim 
merchants in coastal towns.23 According to Woodward,24 the majority 
of the population, notably the lower classes in urban centres, were 
eager to liberate themselves from the caste system, quickly embracing 
the idea of equality before God and Sufism’s emphasis on merit 
instead of inherited status. However, as other scholars have pointed 
out, the ruling classes did not only convert to Islam themselves, but 
also encouraged the general populace to do so as well.25 
Sufi Muslim merchants from Gujarat and Persia began visiting 
West Sumatra in the thirteenth century, establishing trade links 
through the gold industry. Gold traders from both the west and east 
coasts of Sumatra carried Sufi Islam with them to the Minangkabau 
highlands and the centres of the gold trade became the first to be 
converted to Islam.26 Three centuries later, one of the Minangkabau 
kings converted to Islam.27 Conversion took place on a large scale in 
the seventeenth century, when a Sufi centre was established in Ulakan 
                                                                
20 Ibid., p. 15. 
21 Utrecht, “The Muslim Merchant Class,”; M. Woodward, Islam in Java: Normative Piety 
and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989). 
22 Utrecht, “The Muslim Merchant Class,” p. 30. 
23 Kahane, “Religious Diffusion and Modernisation,” p. 130. 
24 Woodward, Islam in Java: Normative Piety. 
25 Johns, “Sufism as A Category”. 
26 C. Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy: Central Sumatra, 1784-184 
(London: Curzon Press, 1983), p. 119. 
27 J. Hadler, Muslims and Matriarchs (London: Cornell University Press, 2008b), p. 977. 
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in the district of present-day Padang Pariaman.28 Syaikh Burhanuddin, 
known as the Tuanku (religious leader) of Ulakan, was the first Sufi 
teacher of the tarekat organisation, Syattariyah, in Ulakan.29 
The Influence of Orthodoxy 
The hold of Sufism in West Sumatra was not to go unchallenged. 
Changes in the wider Islamic world and their continuing impact on 
Malay Muslims gradually affected the form of Islam in the region. The 
modern reform movement only became influential in the nineteenth 
century, but orthodox Islam began infiltrating Sumatra as early as the 
seventeenth century. The first orthodox Muslim preacher in Malay 
Sumatra was Nuruddin al-Raniri, from Randir in Gujarat, who had 
studied Islam in Mecca before travelling to Aceh in 1637.30 Raniri 
favoured the orthodoxy that he had learned in the Middle East over 
the Sufi mysticism that had its roots in India, and he set about 
spreading the teachings of a more shari’a-oriented Islam.31 
According to van Dijck,32 the introduction of orthodox Islam into 
the Malay world marked the beginning of a new chapter in the 
relationship between Islam and the state, in which Islam became a 
considerable source of social tension, ranging from dissatisfaction with 
indigenous symbols, rebellion against local rulers, to all-out war. The 
most important of these conflicts in West Sumatra was the Paderi war, 
which took place between 1803 and 1837. It was initiated by West 
Sumatran pilgrims returning from Mecca, who sought to implement 
                                                                
28 J. Hadler, “A Historiography of Violence and the Secular State in Indonesia: Tuanku 
Imam Bondjol and the Uses of History,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 67 no. 3 (2008a), 
p. 977. 
29 Taufik Abdullah, “Adat and Islam: An Examination of Conflict in Minangkabau,” 
Indonesia 2, no. 1 (1966): pp. 1-24. There is some disagreement on this. According al-
Attas, the Acehnese Syaikh Abdullah Arif, Sheikh Burhanuddin’s teacher, introduced 
Islam into Padang Pariaman in West Sumatra in the seventeenth century. See, S.M.N. 
Al-Attas, Preliminary Statement on a General Theory of the Islamization of The Malay-Indonesian 
Archipelago (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka. 1969). 
30 Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-
Indonesian and Middle Eastern ‘Ulama in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2004).  
31 Ibid., p. 63 
32 C. van Dijck, “Islam and Socio-Political Conflicts in Indonesian History,” Social 
Compass, 31, no. 1 (1984), p. 8. 
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the principles of Wahhabism they had encountered in Saudi Arabia 
over the way Islam was practised their homeland. The term itself was 
derived from Pedir or Pidie, the part of Aceh where Malays set out on 
and returned from the pilgrimage.33 
According to Dobbin,34 the Paderi war exploited changing 
economic and social relations among the Minangkabau. The collapse 
of the existing cash economy, which had been based on gold mining, 
led to the emergence of a new system based on the cultivation of 
coffee, which transformed economic and political relationships 
between and within villages. The wealthy were thrown into turmoil by 
the collapse of the gold industry at precisely the same time that it 
became possible for those at the bottom of the economic ladder to 
cultivate coffee in the hills on common village lands without the need 
for large investments. This gave rise to a group of ‘new rich’ farmers 
eager to challenge the economic order.35 Before the Paderi war, an 
emerging leader of this group, Tuanku Nan Tuo, had taken steps to 
secure trading routes by promoting Islamic regulations and 
confronting those responsible for robberies and other forms of 
misconduct.36 According to Dobbin,37 the introduction of Islamic 
regulations also made it possible for leaders such as Tuanku Nan Tuo 
to claim the land necessary for coffee cultivation from traditional 
landholders, thus further cementing the new economic order. 
The Paderi movement emerged in these newly rich coffee villages. 
It sought to challenge the entrenched positions of wealthy traditional 
leaders, aiming to replace what its followers perceived to be a corrupt 
traditional order with the laws of Islam.38 The movement’s most 
prominent leader was Peto Syarif, who became better known as 
Tuanku Imam Bonjol. Establishing a fortress in Bonjol, the Paderi 
movement flourished for thirty-five years, before the Dutch, acting in 
support of the traditional order, finally took full control of the 
Minangkabau heartlands in 1837. The Paderi leaders were subsequently 
                                                                
33 Ibid., p. 10. 
34 Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy.  
35 van Dijck, “Islam and Socio-Political Conflicts,” p. 9. 
36 Ibid., p. 10. 
37 Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy, pp. 127-8. 
38 van Dijck, “Islam and Socio-Political Conflicts,” p. 10. 
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captured and exiled,39 bringing the Paderi movement to an end. 
However, some Paderi leaders joined the tarekat Naqsabandiyah, 
which later attacked the Sufi tarekat, Syatariyah.40 
By attacking the authority of traditional leaders, the Paderi 
movement also attacked an interpretation of Islam, since customary 
law (adat) and Islam had influenced one another for centuries, and 
both had come to incorporate elements of the other.41 West Sumatra’s 
adat leaders were also Muslims, albeit superficial and heterodox in the 
eyes of the Paderi movement. Indeed, the complexities of the Paderi 
war point to the fact that adat and Islam may be interpreted differently, 
and each may be used for political or economic gain.42 
Islamic Politics under the Dutch 
The Dutch, who had an interest in gaining control over the coffee 
trade, sided with traditional adat leaders against the Paderi 
movement.43 They continued to favour the adat leaders, promising 
them taxation concessions in the 1833 Long Declaration (Plakat 
Panjang), which abolished a cultivation system in favour of a direct 
tax.44 This enabled the Paderi movement to identify adat leaders as 
friends of the enemy. Indeed, the term ‘Adat Basandi Syarak’ (local 
customs are based on Syari’a), among the Minangkabau of West 
Sumatra, was coined by Tuanku Imam Bonjol during the Paderi war 
specifically in response to the Dutch positioning of adat as a superior 
source of authority over Islam.45 
                                                                
39 Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy, pp. 193-206. 
40 TaufikAbdullah, “Modernisation in the Minangkabau World: West Sumatra in the 
Early Decades of the Twentieth Century,” in C. Holt (ed.), Culture and Politics in 
Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p.203. 
41 van Dijck, “Islam and Socio-Political Conflicts,” p. 11. 
42 R. Biezeveld, “The Many Roles of Adat in West Sumatra,” in J.S. Davidsonand D. 
Henley, The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: the Deployment of Adat from Colonialism 
to Indigenism (London, New York: Routledge, 2007). 
43 Ibid., p. 208. 
44 A. Kahin, Rebellion to Integration: West Sumatra and the Indonesian Polity (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 1999), p. 25. 
45 Hadler, “A Historiography of Violence,” p. 986. ‘Adat basandi Syarak, Syarak 
basandi Adat’ was widely accepted as a form of compromise between Islamic and adat 
leaders by 1837. See Hadler, Muslims and Matriarchs, p. 29. 
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In 1847, the Dutch appointed adat leaders in West Sumatra as 
colonial agents charged with collecting the coffee harvest through 
forced cultivation, in order to improve the collection and delivery of 
this crop. At that time, the new position of ‘traditional leader 
responsible for forced labour’ (panghulu suku rodi) was created to 
implement the government’s coffee policies in many nagari, with the 
salaries attached to the positions being a percentage of the coffee 
production of their areas.46 When the Dutch introduced the Ethical 
Policy at the end of the nineteenth century, local Muslims interpreted it 
as not only being linked to the Dutch support for adat, but also as part 
of the effort to undermine Islam and strengthen the position of 
Christian missionaries.47 
In 1914, the Nagari Ordinance was passed with the aim of re-
establishing West Sumatra’s autonomous village communities and 
recognising the right of adat leaders to hold authority in the nagari.48 
The Dutch also attempted to codify adat in 1929, using information 
gathered from native customary law tribunals, the opinions of chiefs 
and elders who were consulted by van Vollenhoven and other adat 
scholars.49 The key issues at stake were those of marriage, divorce, and 
inheritance, issues over which there was a real competition between 
adat and Islamic law. 
In the early twentieth century, attacks on traditionalist Islam in 
West Sumatra were coming from the proponents of both secular 
modernity and modernist Islam. In 1906, Datuk Sutan Maharaja 
established a movement that promoted education for women on the 
basis of their status in Minangkabau culture. In order to improve their 
position, he established twelve schools for women and a feminist 
newspaper, Sunting Melayu (Malay Ornament), which was edited by his 
daughter, Ratna Djuita and later by Rohana Kudus, the ‘Kartini of 
                                                                
46 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 26. 
47 H.J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 
(The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), p. 339. 
48 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 26. 
49 M.A. Jaspan, “In Quest of New Law: The Perplexity of Legal Syncretism in 
Indonesia,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 7 no. 3 (1965), p. 252. 
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West Sumatra’.50 In 1910, he went on to establish the Minangkabau 
Union (Minangkabausche Bond) to unite all Minangkabau people 
living in the darek and the rantau including Aceh and Negeri Sembilan. 
At the same time, reformists Muslim led by those who had been 
students of Syaikh Achmad Khatib in Mecca, such as Djamil Djambek 
in Bukittinggi, Haji Abdullah Ahmad in Padang, Haji Rasul in Padang 
Panjang, and Taib Umar in Batu Sangkar, among others, not only 
challenged the adat-oriented interpretation of progress favoured by 
Datuk Sutan Maharaja, but also attacked the heterodoxy of the Sufi 
orders and the Minangkabau matrilineal inheritance system, arguing 
that the former two ideas were heretical and the later was an 
infringement of Sharia.51 Reformist Muslim ideas had spread in 
Indonesia after the opening of Suez Canal in the nineteenth century, 
which saw an increasing number of pilgrims travelling from the 
archipelago to Mecca and Egypt. As Laffan has demonstrated, these 
connections were crucial to the Indonesian nationalist movement 
because they provided an alternative model to Europe for modernising 
intellectuals.52 
Influenced by the Young Turks movement in the Ottoman 
Empire, a group of reformist Minangkabau Muslims called the Kaum 
Muda (Group of the Young), set themselves up in opposition to the 
Kaum Tua (Group of the Elders), a term they used to refer to the Sufi 
orders.53 As in other parts of the Malay world, the reformists attacked 
Sufi heterodoxy, urging a return to the Qur’a>n and the H {adi>th. They 
also denounced Islamic practices which they saw as heterodox, for 
example the way in which the Prophet’s birthday was celebrated. In the 
case of the matrilineal system, however, the Kaum Muda compromised 
                                                                
50 Taufik Abdullah, Schools and Politics: the Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927-
1933) (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1971), p. 
12. 
51 Taufik Abdullah, “Islam, History, and Social Change in Minangkabau’, in L.L. 
Thomas and F.V. Benda-Beckmann, Change and Continuity in Minangkabau: Local, regional 
and Historical Perspectives on West Sumatra (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Centre for 
International Studies, 1985), p. 141. 
52 M. Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds  
(London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); See also, Azra, The Origins of Islamic 
Reformism in Southeast Asia. 
53 Abdullah, Schools and Politics, p. 16. 
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by suggesting that inheritance be divided into two categories, ‘high 
inheritance’ (pusaka tinggi) or ‘ancestral inheritance’ (harto pusako) and 
‘low inheritance’ (pusaka rendah)or ‘individual inheritance’ (harta 
pencaharian). The first category would continue to be distributed 
according to the matrilineal line, while the second category was to be 
transferred in accordance with Islamic inheritance law.54 The division 
in the inheritance system shows how firmly Islam had become part of 
Minangkabau identity.  
Nationalism of West Sumatran Muslim 
In the early twentieth century, an anti-Dutch rebellion broke out in 
Minangkabau after the 1908 introduction of direct taxation by the 
Dutch, a policy that disregarded the promises made to adat leaders in 
the Long Declaration. Uprisings ensued in many parts of West 
Sumatra, led by both Islamic and adat leaders. Cooperation between 
the Islamic and adat leaders marked the genesis of nationalism in the 
struggle against the Dutch in West Sumatra. 55 
Meanwhile, tensions between the Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua were 
initially reduced with the emergence of the nationalist movement. The 
vehicle for reconciliation was the establishment of a branch of Sarekat 
Islam in Padang in 1915 by two Kaum Tua leaders, Haji Achmad, a 
local Muslim merchant, and Syaikh Chatib Ali, a Kaum Tua leader. A 
number of Kaum Muda followers joined the organisation,56 but the 
truce did not last long. Five months later, the Padang branch of 
Sarekat Islam split into two opposing groups, the White Card (Kartu 
Putih) faction established by the Kaum Muda and the Red Card (Kartu 
Merah) faction aligned with the Kaum Tua. The more left-wing Red 
Card faction was recognised by Sarekat Islam in Java because of its 
opposition to Dutch colonialism while the White Card faction had the 
approval of the Dutch.57 
                                                                
54 Abdullah, “Islam, History, and Social Change,” p. 143. 
55 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 27. 
56 Abdullah, Schools and Politics,pp. 24-6. 
57 Datuk Sutan Maharaja responded to the establishment of the West Sumatran Sarekat 
Islam by forming a Minangkabau Adat party called the Adat Association of the 
Minangkabau World (Sarekat Adat Alam Minangkabau, SAAM) in September 1916. 
Most of the party’s members were local panghulu and their adat staff. Datuk Sutan 
Maharaja not only cooperated with the Dutch but also formulated his own 
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Muhammadiyah also came to play an important role in the Kaum 
Muda movement. Muhammadiyah was introduced to West Sumatra in 
1925 by Abdul Karim Amrullah, also known as Haji Rasul, a strident 
opponent of communism who had spent time in Java. By 1927, one-
fifth of the whole population of his nagari of Sungai Batang, Maninjau, 
around 2,440 people, had joined the organisation.58 From Maninjau, 
Muhammadiyah subsequently established branches in Padang Panjang 
in 1926, Bukittinggi in 1927, Padang and Batusangkar in 1928, where it 
provided a base for West Sumatrans who sought to distance 
themselves from the revolutionary communists who dominated the 
local branch of Sarekat Islam.59 
Islam and the Rise of Political Parties 
From the 1920s to the1940s, a range of political parties emerged in 
Indonesia as the level of political activism increased.the Kaum Muda 
established a politically-oriented socio-economic organisation, the 
Association of Indonesian Muslims (Persatuan Muslim Indonesia, 
Permi) in 1930, which became a political party in 1932.60 The Kaum 
Tua established the Association of Islamic Schools (Persatuan 
Tarbiyah Islamiyah, PTI) in the same year.61 A local branch of the PSII 
was established in 1930, while a local branch of the PNI was 
established in 1932.62 In 1932, Permi proclaimed itself as a revolu-
tionary and non-cooperative party by refusing to hoist the Dutch flag 
during religious celebrations.63 In 1933, Kaum Tua, Kaum Muda, 
                                                                                                                                      
explanations for the relationship between adat and religion, in which adat was 
positioned as being in line with Sufi Islam, and tasauf (a personal approach to God). 
His rejection of the idea that adat should be directly based on Islamic laws, as was 
claimed by Kaum Muda movement, led him to cooperate with the Kaum Tua. See 
Abdullah, “Modernisation in the Minangkabau World,” p. 230 and p. 232.  
58 Abdullah, Schools and Politics,p. 78. 
59 Ibid., p. 71, and pp. 84-90. Kahin argues that West Sumatran society at this time was 
plural and the categorisation of society into adat, Islamic and communist blocs is 
unhelpful. See Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 84. 
60 Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 50. 
61 Abdullah, Schools and Politics, p. 135. 
62 Ibid., p. 110 and p. 183 
63 Ibid., p. 176. 
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Muhammadiyah and the local branch of PSII also began to adopt a 
revolutionary stance.64 In response, in 1933 the Dutch imprisoned the 
leaders of Permi and the PSII, including Rasuna Said, Rasimah Ismail, 
Datuk Singo Mangkuto and Djamaluddin.65 In 1938, the colonial 
authorities established the Minangkabau Council (Dewan 
Minangkabau) in an attempt to control increasingly radical local 
political organisations.66 
Islamic Politics and the Japanese Occupation 
The arrival of the Japanese in 1942 increased enthusiasm for the 
cause of independence. The Japanese not only put an end to Dutch 
power but also promoted nationalist and anti-Western sentiments in 
the country.67 Japanese troops arrived in Padang in March 1942 and 
the local Dutch commander surrendered ten days later.68 West Sumatra 
was then managed by the Department of Military Administration 
(Gunseibu) of the 25th Army in Singapore, one of three Japanese 
military commands in Indonesia; other two being the 16th Army in Java 
and the Navy in the eastern islands and Kalimantan.69 A year later, the 
25th Army headquarters moved to Bukittinggi, from where it 
administered the whole of Sumatra.70 
In West Sumatra, the Japanese established a People’s Committee 
(Komite Rakyat) to succeed the Dutch Minangkabau Council, along 
with an organisation called Greater Japan Youth (Pemuda Nippon 
Raja) led by Chatib Sulaiman. However, after the Japanese 
consolidated their authority in the region in late 1942, all organisations 
were banned from political activities.71 After suppressing political 
                                                                
64 Divisions between Islamic organisations also emerged. For example, Permi accused 
Muhammadiyah of being too close to the Dutch while Muhammadiyah accused Permi 
activists of not being motivated by Islam. Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 264.  
65 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 56. 
66 Ibid., p. 90. 
67 A. Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), pp. 86-7. 
68 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 95. 
69 Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia, p. 88. 
70 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 95. 
71 Ibid., pp. 79-80. 
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organisations, the Japanese authorities sought to play a role both 
within adat and Islam. At the supra-village level, they favoured Islam, 
for example, by sending Islamic leaders from West Sumatra to a Malay 
Islamic conference in Singapore and establishing the Minangkabau 
Supreme Islamic Council (Majlis Islam Tinggi Minangkabau) in 1943.72 
At the village level, on the other hand, local adat leaders were given 
power through the maintenance of the Dutch administrative 
apparatus.73 
Islamic Politics after Independence 
West Sumatra was deeply involved in national politics, and in the 
politics of Islam, during the Sukarno years as a consequence of the 
engagement of Minangkabau figures like Haji Agus Salim from the 
PSII, Hatta and Sjahrir in the nationalist movement, and their 
subsequent rise to power within the Republican ranks. The province 
itself was also a site of Republican activity. In an attempt to shore up 
support for a return to colonial status, the Dutch promoted the 
concept of a Minangkabau state (Negara Minangkabau) through local 
adat leaders, introducing a form of regional government called General 
Unity (Persatuan Umum), which had a military arm called the 
Association of Black Cats (Serikat Kucing Hitam) in 1946. This 
initiative, which attracted adat leaders who had been officials during 
the Dutch colonial period, served to increase the polarisation between 
these local leaders and Islamic groups.74 
As part of its campaign against the Republicans, in 1947, the 
Dutch introduced the Special Autonomous Region of West Sumatra 
(Daerah Istimewa Sumatera Barat, DISBA) in Padang, as a step 
towards the planned establishment of the Negara Minangkabau in 
1949.75 Ultimately, however, this initiative failed, and, as noted above, 
Bukittinggi became the seat of the Emergency Government of the 
                                                                
72 Oki, A. Social Change in the West Sumatran Village: 1908-1945. 1978. Available at: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/16895, accessed on 12 February 2010. 
73 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 106. 
74 Ibid., pp. 110-1. 
75 Ibid., p. 152. 
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Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintahan Darurat Republik Indonesia, 
PDRI) after the Dutch attack on Yogyakarta in 1948.76 
Relations between the Republic and local Muslim politicians began 
to sour with the signing of the Linggajati Agreement in 1947. Islamic 
groups such as Masyumi and Muhammadiyah and religious militia such 
as Hizbullah, Sabilillah and Lasjmi accused the regional Republican and 
military leaders of continuing to maintain close ties to the Dutch and 
proceeded to stage an attempted coup in March 1947. Kahin77 argues 
that the attempted coup was prompted not only by suspicions of the 
regional Republican government’s close relationship with the Dutch 
but also because Islamic political parties were not represented in the 
village administration and in the regional Republican government. 
They also resented the fact that local Islamic militias were not given 
arms. Islamic groups, according to Kahin, considered higher-ranking 
military officers to be adopting luxurious and immoral lifestyles that 
were inconsistent with Islamic principles.78 Attempts were made to 
bring Islamic militia groups under the control of the regular army after 
the formation of the Banteng Division in 1947. The fusion of the 
militias and the regular forces was not particularly successful, as some 
militia commanders refused to forfeit their independence and some 
military units remained loyal to their militia commanders and to 
various political parties.  
The West Sumatran division of Masyumi joined a movement 
created by veterans of the Banteng Division over the issue of 
regionalism in 1956. Together they formed the Banteng Council and 
declared the Banteng Charter, demanding greater regional autonomy, 
especially in matters of defence and finance. The Banteng council was 
opposed by the local branch of the PKI, which prompted the 
                                                                
76 A. Kahin, “Some Preliminary Observation on West Sumatra during the Revolution,” 
Indonesia, 18 (1974): pp. 76-117.  
77 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 123. 
78 The tension between Islam and the Republican government in West Sumatra also 
affected the relationship with communists in the region. During the March 1947 coup 
the Army commander was Colonel Ismael Lengah, who had a secular education and 
was considered by Islamic groups to be a socialist and a follower of Tan Malaka. 
Lengah refused to return weapons of the Islamic militia even though Muhammad 
Natsir and the Vice President Mohammad Hatta at that time asked him to do so. See, 
Ibid., pp. 125-7 
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formation of a local network called the Joint Movement against 
Communism (Gerakan Bersama Anti Komunisme, GEBAK) on 4 
September 1957. Led by Colonel Dahlan Djambek, GEBAK accused 
communist groups of accepting funds from foreign Chinese, also 
suggesting that communism had caused the split between Sukarno and 
Hatta. Among the propaganda used by GEBAK was the statement 
that West Sumatra was considered as Islamic and national government 
was communist.79 Mansoer Sani, the new military head of Sawah Lunto 
Sijunjung district removed all communists, mostly immigrants from 
Java, from civilian and military positions and arrested their leaders in 
1957. 
The PRRI movement in West Sumatra was headed by Syafruddin 
Prawiranegara and Muhammad Natsir. According to Leirissa,80 the 
rebellion was caused by four factors. First, there had been a significant 
Javanisation of the outer islands from 1955, which local powerbrokers 
feared would enable the national government to easily control Central 
Sumatra. Second, the national economy was in crisis, and poverty was 
rampant not only among civilians but among lower level military units 
in the region. Third, there had been a history of local and national 
coup attempts by communists, including the local attempt on 3 March 
1947 in West Sumatra. Finally, fragmentation in the local and national 
armed military made a regional uprising possible. Kahin,81 however, 
suggests that the PRRI was made possible because of US support as 
part of attempts to encourage a national front against communism. 
The national government sent military forces to the province and 
PRRI leaders were captured and killed in 1961.82 Following the 
rebellion, control over the regional army was put in the hands of 
communist groups within the Diponegoro Division, who proceeded to 
entrench their power in the local military.83 Civilians who supported 
                                                                
79 Kahin argues that Djambek’s accusations should be contextualised in the fact that he 
had been forced to resign from the Indonesian military in Jakarta after being charged 
with corruption, and was seeking opportunities for influence on his return to Padang. 
See, Ibid., pp. 202-4. 
80 R.Z. Leirissa, PRRI Permesta: Strategi Membangun Indonesia Tanpa Komunis (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Utama Grafitti, 1991). 
81 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 198, and p. 207. 
82 Ibid., p. 226. 
83 Ibid., p. 236. 
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the rebellion were also detained in jails or kept under house arrest.84 
The political repression that followed the PRRI prompted many 
Minangkabau to migrate to other regions, including Jakarta, and also to 
Malaysia. 
The involvement of Masyumi leaders in the PRRI and Darul Islam 
rebellions led Sukarno to ban the party and imprison a number of its 
leaders, including Syafruddin and Natsir. The same fate befell the 
Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, PSI) and its 
leaders, including Sukarno’s long-time nemesis, the West Sumatran 
Sutan Sjahrir.85 In West Sumatra, the banning of Masyumi meant that 
Muslims voters were forced to support the traditionalist Perti, which 
had rejected support for the Banteng Council and the PRRI movement 
and agreed with Sukarno’s Guided Democracy.86 It was in this political 
context that Haji Abdul Malik bin Abdul Karim Amrullah, better 
known as Hamka, the son of the founder of Muhammadiyah’s West 
Sumatra branch, Haji Rasul, began criticising Sukarno from Jakarta. 
Hamka had worked in the Ministry of Religion in Jakarta from 1951 to 
1960, also serving as a Masyumi member of the Indonesian 
Constituent Assembly representing Central Java from 1955 to 1960. 
Hamka challenged Sukarno’s personal and political behaviour, 
including his polygamous tendencies and his close association with 
communism, a view widely shared in West Sumatra. Sukarno 
responded by having Hamka arrested in 1964 under the Subversion 
Law. 
After the failure of the alleged communist coup in Jakarta in 1965, 
the national government held trials for regional communist leaders in 
Padang, including Major Djohan Rivai, Leitenant Colonel Bainal and 
Sukirno as well as PKI members such Djajusman.87 Tens of thousands 
of communists were jailed without trial, and although no exact figures 
are available on the number of those killed,88 it is clear that the 
numbers were significant. In addition, communist officials who had 
been dominant in the administrative structure of West Sumatra after 
                                                                
84 Ibid., p. 228. 
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87 Ibid., p. 240. 
88 Ibid., p. 248. 
  
Islam, Politics and Identity in West Sumatra 
113 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 01, June 2013 
the PRRI were replaced by anti-communist military officers in 1966.89 
The regional army under Colonel Poniman also isolated traditional 
adat and religious associations that had been associated with 
communism, such as the Supreme Consultative Council of the Adat of 
the Minangkabau World (Majelis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam 
Minangkabau, MTKAAM) and the Islamic Educational Movement 
Party (Partai Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Perti).90 In their place, a 
new adat organisation, the Minangkabau Adat Consultative Body 
(Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau, LKAAM) and a group 
called the Contact Body for the Struggle of the Islamic Community 
(Badan Kontak Perjuangan Umat Islam, BKPUI) were established in 
1966.91 
Islam and Politics in Suharto’s Indonesia 
In an attempt to mend bridges in West Sumatra, on coming to 
power, the Suharto regime appointed Harun Zain, a Minangkabau 
born in Jakarta but then a teacher at Andalas University in Padang, as 
governor of the province in 1967. Harun was eager to show West 
Sumatrans that they would benefit by working with the New Order, 
working hard to develop agricultural and communication infrastructure 
in the province. In 1969, as part of the lead-up to the 1971 election, 
the military officer Saafroedin Bahar was appointed head of the local 
Golkar branch. He subsequently led the campaign to convince West 
Sumatra’s people that support for Golkar was crucial for the 
continuance of regional development (Interview with Saafroedin 
Bahar, 3 November 2010). In West Sumatra, Golkar ultimately 
bettered its national average, winning 63 per cent of the votes in that 
election.  
Harun also sought to re-establish an understanding of 
Minangkabau heritage and regional identity that did not emphasise 
Islam, for example by promoting the use of traditional architecture in 
official buildings. As part of this push, Islamic leaders were sidelined in 
Harun’s regional development program. Supporters of Masyumi, for 
                                                                
89 Ibid., p. 235. 
90 Ibid., pp. 245-6. 
91 Interview with Saafroedin Bahar, 3 November 2010. 
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example, were asked to distance themselves from political Islam in the 
interests of regional development.  
Azwar Anas, a military officer, replaced Harun Zain as Governor 
of West Sumatra in 1977. The greatest challenge he faced during his 
term in office was that of implementing Law No. 5/1979 on Village 
Governance, which determined the basis on which funding was to be 
allocated to each province. Although Azwar succeeded in establishing 
a way of identifying villages (based on the Javanese concept of the desa) 
that did not disadvantage the province in terms of funding (Kahin 
1999: 258), the implementation of this law undermined the status of 
the nagari, which not only linked rural society to land, inheritance and 
rice cultivation but also to social and cultural relationships, including 
those based on kinship and cultural Islam.  
In an attempt to retain some traditional authority, Azwar 
established a Village Adat Council (Kerapatan Adat Nagari, KAN) 
within each desa in 1983.92 However, local dissatisfaction with the 
division of nagari into several desa continued to grow. After Hasan 
Basri Durin was appointed governor in 1987, he overturned Azwar’s 
policy, regrouping some of the smallest desa in 1988.93 He also 
encouraged cooperation between traditional rural leaders, Islamic 
scholars, intellectuals and government officials, establishing the 
Manunggal Sakato program in 1990. In the following year he 
established Village Development Discussion Bodies (Musyawarah 
Pembangunan Nagari, MPN), which were made up of both nagari 
leaders and government officials.  
Muchlis Ibrahim replaced Durin as governor in 1997 but he 
stepped down two years later when his recommendation for the 
position of Deputy Governor was rejected by the central government. 
Ibrahim had supported Nurmawan, a bureaucrat in the provincial 
office. However, Syarwan Hamid, the Minister for Internal Affairs, 
appointed Zainal Bakar, the candidate backed by the regional 
parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD). The tension 
between the governor and the DPRD marked the beginning of a new 
era in West Sumatran local politics, in which Islam once more became 
                                                                
92 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 260. 
93 Between 1987 and 1996, the number of desa decreased by 1,000. See Ibid., p. 261. 
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a pivotal factor after many years in the wilderness under the New 
Order. 
Conclusion  
The paper has demonstrated the relationship between Islam and 
Minangkabau culture was simultaneously accommodating and 
contested, and that the strong association between Islam and regional 
identity only solidified in the post-Suharto era. The 
Minangkabaus’connection with the Malay world increased the 
acceptance of orthodox Islam, first introduced by reformist Muslims 
coming back from Mecca in the 17th century. Gradually, orthodoxy, 
and later Wahabism, largely replaced the Sufi form first adopted, which 
was more accommodating of local beliefs. However, as also shown 
here, Islam as an ideology was subordinated after Independence days, 
and again under the New Order, this time to a largely secular 
formulation of national identity. 
Indeed, it has only been in the post-Suharto period that Islam has 
assumed a hegemonic position in Minangkabau identity discourse. In 
contemporary West Sumatra, regional governments has been utilising 
claims that local customs are based on Islam and Islam is based on the 
Qur’a>n (Adat Basandi Syarak, Syarak Basandi Kitabullah, ABS-SBK). This 
assertion is ubiquitous, appearing as justification for almost every 
political decision made at the provincial level and below. Moreover, 
every disaster, from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis to natural disasters 
such as floods, landslides and earthquakes, has been attributed to the 
community’s failure to meet its religious obligations. For example, after 
the 2004 tsunami, large billboards were displayed throughout the city 
of Padang proclaiming ‘religiosity must be practised in order to prevent 
a tsunami’. [] 
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